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A B S T R A C T
The contemporary debate considering the use of natural resources in economic growth centres around the
concept of ‘decoupling’ driven through improvements in resource eﬃciency. Many studies extrapolate future
demand from a short time series of previous years. However, we believe there should be greater attention on the
underlying demand assumptions and the possibility of long-term changes. Accordingly, this paper is concerned
with a potential saturation in material use as a result of countries moving through stages of development over
decades from early industrialisation, over mass production and into a mature stage. An observation of such
saturation is relevant for global environmental change as future demand for resources could be lower than
currently expected, leading to less associated environmental pressures. In particular, emerging economies are
undergoing changing growth patterns, and their future resource use may be signiﬁcantly lower than con-
temporary analysis suggests.
This paper combines the analytical strands of resource economics and material ﬂow analysis. It investigates
both material-speciﬁc demand and stock build-up trends over an extended time horizon of a century. Four
materials (steel, cement, aluminium and copper) are analysed applying an indicator called ‘Apparent Domestic
Consumption’ (ADC) and using international trade data for four industrialised countries (Germany, Japan, UK,
USA) together with China as the most preeminent emerging economy.
Our results conﬁrm the occurrence of a saturation eﬀect for most materials considered. While the evidence is
strong for the per capita apparent consumption of steel, copper and cement in the four industrialised countries, it
is somewhat weaker for aluminium. Also, such saturation in material use can start at diﬀerent income levels,
with the saturation beginning to occur relatively early for steel and cement ($12,000 GDP/capita) and later for
copper ($20,000 GDP/capita). The results suggest a time gap of around thirty+ years from the take-oﬀ of large-
scale adoption of one type of material and any saturation occurring. We also shed light on the build-up of stocks
in the economy, where our ﬁndings suggest there is a delayed saturation of at least twenty years compared to
apparent consumption depending on the lifetimes of capital goods.
With regard to China, a demand saturation for steel and copper has already started to occur, and our analysis
suggests such saturation will soon take place for cement. These ﬁndings provide a more moderate outlook on
China’s future material demand compared to an extrapolation of recent dynamics.
Our new insights on the nexus between economic growth, development stages and the use of natural re-
sources have implications for the decoupling debate and for investments into commodities. From a wider en-
vironmental policy perspective, one may expect China and other emerging economies to achieve a saturation
eﬀect soon and therefore also peak their industrial emissions of greenhouse gases, supporting the nationally
determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.
1. Introduction
The turmoil encountered in Chinese stock markets during
2015–2016 can be viewed as part of a broader picture about
fundamental uncertainties related with growth expectations for emer-
ging economies and the world economy as a whole. Although changes
in growth rates are due to a number of factors, one important driver
relates to commodities and the consumption of natural resources. There
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T
is an interest in understanding how diﬀerent future socio-economic
pathways may accelerate the use of resources as well as how resource
prices may feedback on to growth rates. Recent studies suggest the
world economy could double the amount of global extraction by 2050
compared to 2015 (UNEP, 2016: 10;Schandl et al., 2016), or a tripling
compared to 2010 (UNEP, 2011: 28f), although with a great level of
uncertainty.
One fundamental issue is whether the Chinese economy will shift
toward a more service- and consumption-based economy. If so, Chinese
production may well increase its resource use at a slower rate compared
to previous increases, or perhaps even experience an absolute reduction
at a certain stage. There appears to be a clear acknowledgement that, in
policy terms, the implications of development stages for resource fu-
tures require further attention. It is therefore pertinent to ascertain
what the impacts of changes in growth and materials use and stocks will
be on the overall demand for natural resources and the wider economy?
This transition in a country’s structure is often referred to as de-
coupling the use of resources from GDP. The International Resource
Panel calls it the “imperative of modern environmental policy” (UNEP,
2017: 14). With a view to emerging economies such as China, however,
it appears that the contemporary debate has to reconnect with nuanced
analysis on a saturation eﬀect, i.e. a deeper understanding of devel-
opment stages and the intensity of material use over time as put for-
ward by Malenbaum (1978) and summarised by Cleveland and Ruth
(1998). Insights into a saturation eﬀect are relevant for global en-
vironmental change as the future demand for resources may be con-
siderably lower than expected, leading to less associated environmental
pressures. In particular, emerging economies are changing their growth
patterns, and their future resource use may be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from what the contemporary analysis suggests.
A key issue is to adopt a long-term view. Any analysis which is
looking ahead to 2030 – when the SDGs ought to be delivered − or
2050 and beyond requires analysis of previous decades to understand
how countries have already developed. Such analysis should include
the period after WWII when growth rates in most industrialised coun-
tries were remarkably high and, if possible, the entire last century to
account for the build-up of infrastructures. Research should not adopt a
year such as 1990 as a starting point for decoupling analysis or for
extrapolations (which is the base year of the UNFCCC and some data-
bases e.g. Wiedmann et al., 2015) as limitations for analysing structural
changes and foresight are obvious.
Under such a circumstance, this study aims to identify the levels in
economic development after which the use of key materials saturates or
even declines. Our article analyses the use of four reﬁned materials
(steel, cement, aluminium and copper) in four industrialised countries
(USA, UK, Germany, and Japan) and China over the 1900–2013 time-
frame. In order to include the embodied imports in semi-ﬁnished and
ﬁnished goods, we move away from a focus on production towards one
on ‘Apparent Domestic Consumption’ (ADC) by including the material
intensities of key product groups and internationally traded commod-
ities. Adopting a conventional production view on those materials
would imply that countries which rely on net physical imports to cater
for their domestic demand appeared to perform well in terms of de-
coupling, while in reality they are simply shifting elements of their
production base abroad. Our indicator ‘Apparent Domestic
Consumption’ (ADC) is able to give a more nuanced view where such
bias is minimised. We also use this method to estimate the build-up of
stocks. The underlying questions are:
- Is there a trend in those developed countries toward a saturation of
demand for materials and can a value for such saturation levels be
estimated? What are the trends for China? What are the develop-
ment patterns of the build-up stocks in industrialised countries and
is there evidence of a material-speciﬁc stock saturation?
- How can the projections of material consumption in emerging
economies be informed by a potential stock saturation in developed
economies? What evidence can be given for a time gap of material
consumption between developed and emerging countries given their
heterogeneous development stages?
In order to answer such questions, an integrated approach that
combines the strengths of diﬀerent methods should be adopted. We
follow an international life-cycle perspective of using materials that is
speciﬁc to Material Flow Analysis (MFA) and industrial ecology.
However, considering our focus on reﬁned materials and not on raw
materials (e.g. iron ore, bauxite), we adopt the ‘Apparent Domestic
Consumption’ (ADC) indicator employed in other cross-country steel
use studies (Wårell, 2014; Pauliuk et al., 2013) and apply it to four
materials in ﬁve countries. Terms and methodological diﬀerences are
explained below. We also consider income per capita over time mea-
sured in real terms as we intend to gain insights for future research on
modelling socio-economic pathways. The authors acknowledge some
inherent limitations, as possible substitutions are likely to be over-
looked (e.g. increased applications of plastics), and analysing resource
productivity in general requires the inclusion of feedback eﬀects using
more comprehensive data and relevant issues such as the rebound ef-
fect. Future research will be able to use our approach and ﬁll those
gaps. The wider picture of shedding light on future demand of emerging
economies for macro-economic modelling purposes, and the delivery of
the SDGs (in particular SDG 12 on sustainable resource management)
encourages such a study.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction
section, Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the debates on intensity-of-use, de-
coupling, and metabolism in the broader context of growth and re-
sources. Section 3 describes our research methodology. Section 4 pre-
sents our research results and Section 5 discusses these ﬁndings. Finally,
Section 6 draws research conclusions and provides policy implications
for future infrastructure investments in emerging economies. Addi-
tional information on the material intensity data and a sensitivity
analysis is given in the Supplementary information ﬁles.
2. A short review on growth and resources
A number of growth theories emerged from the 1950s. Among them
Rostow (1960) developed a growth theory covering diﬀerent develop-
ment stages which posits that all economies experienced various
transformations from early take-oﬀ to industrialisation and then move
towards mature economies where services and consumption are the
dominant patterns. Although this proposition was contested by other
development and growth theories, it reappeared in the 1970s, with a
focus on ‘limits to growth’ (Meadows et al., 1972) along with the un-
precedented price peaks for energy and other commodities. Rostow also
argued against any evidences of scarcity for raw materials and pointed
at innovation as well as at the decline of the rate of raw materials use in
relation to increases in real income in the more advanced industrialised
nations (Rostow, 1978: 616).
An ‘intensity use’ hypothesis was developed by Malenbaum (1978),
and further elaborated by Tilton (1985) and Auty (1985), adding em-
pirical evidences for a number of materials across diﬀerent countries
and time periods. However, the overall ﬁndings on whether materials
intensity per GDP declines with economic maturity remained ambig-
uous at that time. The basic concept was seen as vaguely deﬁned be-
cause the data and measurement eﬀorts had several limitations which
did not yield unequivocal results, and the underlying drivers were still
unclear. Later, with emerging input-output data, it was concluded that
future research should be based on better and more comprehensive data
(Auty, 1985). Cleveland and Ruth (1998) conducted a further survey on
the state of this debate. However, research progress has been limited,
with few contemporary publications explicitly referring to a saturation
level. Although Tilton and Guzmán (2016) published a textbook on
mineral economics and policy, they did not conduct any analysis on
such issues. Wårell (2014) investigated the intensity-of-use hypothesis
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for steel with data from 61 countries, covering over 42 years. They
concluded that the hypothesis is valid for the middle-income countries.
Finally, a steel analysis was conducted for China by Yin and Chen
(2013).
In parallel, the broader debates on growth and development have
changed signiﬁcantly since the 1980s, adding human capital, innova-
tions, and new opportunities for developing countries via the so-called
endogeneous growth theory throughout the 1990s (Barro, Romer,
Aghion, Tirole et al.). During those years, raw material prices had de-
clined, leading to less attention for scarcity issues. Patterns of economic
growth shifted to formerly developing countries such as China and a
multi-polar growth world emerged, with increasing economic ties
among developing and middle-income countries (see the recent at-
tempts to formulate a ‘uniﬁed growth theory’ in Galor 2013).
The more recent debates often refer to a “decoupling” of resource
use from GDP. These began in the 2000s e.g. through the OECD
Environmental Strategy 2001 and the Sixth Environment Action
Programme of the European Community (2002). The decoupling ana-
lysis forms part of wider discussions on global environmental change
and especially considers (a) a decoupling of GDP from environmental
impacts, and (b) a decoupling of GDP from resource use, i.e. indicators
looking at the aggregated use of natural resources based on MFA.
The “decoupling” debate was also rooted in concepts such as Factor
Four (von Weizsäcker et al., 1998) and Factor 10 (Schmidt-Bleek, 2009)
with numerous examples as well as in the debate about an ‘Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve’ on pollutants and GDP growth. Decoupling of
resource use was based on MFA that emerged in the 1990s (e.g.
(Adriaanse et al., 1997; Matthews et al., 2000). UNEP’s International
Resource Panel has contributed key documents to the decoupling de-
bate (UNEP, 2011, 2014, 2017), while many ongoing research projects
focus on countries and regions and also decoupling drivers (West et al.,
2014; Schandl and West, 2010; Bringezu et al., 2004; Steger and
Bleischwitz, 2011).
In addition, another debate on decoupling indicators exists that
analyses system boundaries, international trade, and environmental
impacts (Hoekstra and Wiedmann, 2014; Giljum et al., 2014; Tukker
et al., 2014; Hertwich et al., 2010; Nansai et al., 2015; Saurat and
Ritthoﬀ 2013).
Unfortunately, these studies suﬀer from data restrictions as the in-
itial data year is often 1990 (Wiedmann et al., 2015) or even later,
which is after the take-oﬀ of most currently developed nations. For
Domestic Material Consumption (DMC), the OECD (2015) applies data
from 1980 onwards, and data are now available from 1970 onwards
(UNEP, 2017). However, even those base years are much later than the
period for the resource-intensive early stage in most industrialised
countries. Also, these studies did not explicitly take a development view
nor did these engage with the intensity-of-use hypothesis.
In contrast, the academic debate about societal or industrial meta-
bolism takes a historical perspective beginning with what is called
hunting and gathering as well as agrarian ‘regimes’ that were present
long before the industrial revolution emerged in the 18th − 19th
century (Ayres, 1989; Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 2007; Wrigley,
2013; Sieferle, 2001). This debate partly refers to Perez (2010) and
other historians with much broader interests in the overall economic
development, providing policy-relevant insights into the great trans-
formations such as the beginning of using fossil fuels at a large scale.
Wiedenhofer et al. (2013) characterised the pattern of many resource-
related indicators as the “70 s syndrome”. In general, this strand of
research appears relatively descriptive, driven by statistical analysis
and without an explicit debate about material use intensity and eco-
nomic development stages.
The existing studies have other interesting features such as: the
shape of the growth curve i.e. whether a decoupling occurs at all,
whether data suggests a “re-coupling” (Bringezu and Bleischwitz, 2009:
76f), about the estimation of the anthropogenic stocks in societies
(Rauch, 2009; Gordon et al., 2006; Pauliuk et al., n.d.; Mueller et al.,
2011), about criticality of materials (Graedel et al., 2012), and also
about single commodities (Allwood, 2013; Crowson, 2007; Wårell,
2014).
In conclusion, two main research gaps exist:
(a) the decoupling debate has not yet suﬃciently addressed the re-
lationship between resource use, development stages and economic
growth, most likely due to MFA data restrictions;
(b) the intensity-of-use analysis appears too fragmented and selective
to draw general conclusions with regards to decoupling and the
SDG 12 towards the year 2030. What is required is an inter-
disciplinary approach, aligning physical data on material ﬂows and
stocks with socio-economic analysis about growth patterns and re-
source use across economies over time.
3. Methods and data
3.1. Material ﬂow analysis and apparent domestic consumption
This study follows the general principles of MFA. A core method of
industrial ecology and social metabolism, MFA quantiﬁes ﬂows and
stocks of materials on diﬀerent spatial and temporal scales. It is based
on systems thinking and the mass balance approach in which matter
cannot disappear or be created spontaneously. Matter that enters a
system boundary either stays within the system or leaves this at the end
of the considered period. The MFA framework can be employed to
determine economy-wide metrics which bundle all material use within
a region (SERI database, http://www.materialﬂows.net, or EORA MRIO
database, http://worldmrio.com) or it can capture the use of single
materials (Wårell, 2014; Pauliuk et al., 2013).
This article applies MFA principles to four key reﬁned materials
(steel, cement, aluminium and copper) in ﬁve countries (United States,
United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and China) using production and
trade data for the 1900–2013 period. The selection of these materials is
justiﬁed by the fact that all countries require these in order to develop
their economy. For instance, steel and cement demand is a function of
infrastructure development and urbanisation, while copper and alu-
minium are multifunctional materials for housing, energy, mobility and
consumer goods. Accordingly, these materials are usually the top ma-
terials for commodity markets analysis. We selected these ﬁve countries
as they represent the largest economies in the world. UK and USA are
two countries with early industrialisation patterns. Germany and Japan
are two followers, and China is the most eminent emerging economy.
Our representation of the four considered system topologies (one for
each key material) is simpliﬁed to a few nodes (see Fig. 1): production
and trade of materials in primary form, manufacturing & construction,
international trade of ﬁnished goods and stock build-up. These nodes
are suﬃcient to determine the two metrics of interest calculated for
each selected material − Apparent Domestic Consumption (ADC) and
in-use stocks.
The ADC metric is an estimation of the total annual quantities of one
type of material that are used within the system boundaries and
Fig. 1. System overview of the simpliﬁed MFA design.
Source: the authors’ own compilation
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gradually transformed into ﬁnal demand goods (durable and non-dur-
able consumer goods, capital, infrastructure etc.); ADC is therefore
diﬀerent from the Net Additions to Stocks (NAS) metric by including
goods with a short lifetime, e.g. aluminium in packaging. ADC is de-
termined by adding up country-level primary production with net im-
ports of materials in their primary form and as embedded parts of
products along supply chains until goods delivered to ﬁnal consumers.
ADC does not account for annual changes in inventories. However,
given the long time horizon of the analysis, it was considered that any
inventory addition occurring in one given year has eventually been
employed at a later point. Thus, inventories would not appear as se-
parate accounts; the main limitation to this assumption is that losses
due to dissipation or landﬁlling applicable to materials in primary form
are not included.
We consider anthropogenic stocks in order to also gain an under-
standing of materials potentially becoming available for secondary use
after a certain time. Using the term ‘stocks’ we follow UNEP’s
International Resource Panel deﬁning a stock as the quantity (e.g. mass)
of a chosen material that exists within a given system boundary at a
speciﬁc time; see also e.g. Rauch (2009). In terms of measurement
units, stock is a level variable (i.e. it is measured in kg) as opposed to
material ﬂows (which are rate variables). Stocks are determined based
on the distribution of each material to a representative set of product
groups and on the corresponding lifetime of these groups. The calcu-
lation of stocks for each year is thus derived from that of annual ADCs,
by summing up all annual material consumption values attributed to
products that are expected to be still in-use in that particular year.
The ADC indicator implies similarities and diﬀerences to the ones
often applied in MFA, namely Domestic Material Consumption (DMC)
and Raw Material Consumption (RMC)/Material Footprint (MF).
According to a deﬁnition provided by OECD (2008), DMC measures the
total amount of material directly used in an economy (i.e. the direct
apparent consumption of materials, excluding indirect ﬂows). DMC
thus is a measure of direct physical material use within an economy; it
does not consider the indirect “hidden ﬂows” associated to resource
extraction and transformation taking place outside of the focal
economy. Hence, analyses based on DMC would overlook much of the
shifting of resource use and associated environmental pressures among
countries. This metric is generally associated to the use of raw materials
and is employed in the resource-productivity oriented studies of the
recent years (OECD, 2015). In comparison, RMC/MF is deﬁned as a
consumption-oriented indicator (Eurostat, 2001) based on Raw Mate-
rial Equivalents (RMEs) in that it reﬂects the total material use asso-
ciated with ﬁnal domestic demand by including both direct and indirect
ﬂows of the associated resource extraction. In line with Wiedmann et al.
(2015, see also the excellent Supporting information), RMC can com-
plement those other footprint indicators that prominently feature in the
areas of water and carbon; however, a broader ‘footprint debate’ is
beyond the scope of our article.
Thus, the ADC metric used in this article is not aimed to consider
these indirect ﬂows. Instead, we change the focus from raw materials to
reﬁned materials as done for steel in Wårell (2014) and Pauliuk et al.
(2013), and from a resource productivity view to the angle of the ma-
terial use saturation induced by economic development. We thus pro-
pose that our indicator can provide valuable insights on ‘oﬀ-shoring’ of
material-intensive production via trade while more studies should be
initiated to capture the full range of problem shifting via indirect ﬂows
of waste and pollution abroad.
3.2. Data sources and treatment
Our article tracks the four materials for a considerable time span,
much beyond the timeframe being applied so far for the decoupling
debate, which is relevant and necessary to analyse saturation levels in a
growing economy. Production information for all four materials was
obtained through the USGS Mineral Yearbooks with the starting year of
1928 for steel, 1931 for cement and 1932 for aluminium and copper.
Steel and cement are considered to have begun industrial scale pro-
duction from 1850 onwards, and 1900 for aluminium and copper.
Therefore, production ﬁgures before 1928 for all materials were esti-
mated with a linear production increase. Since copper reﬁning data are
absent in the USGS Yearbooks before 1976, reﬁned copper production
was estimated using USGS smelting data as a proxy − a country-spe-
ciﬁc smelting-to-reﬁning conversion ratio.
The international trade component of the ADC was introduced
through the Physical Trade Balance of each country derived from UN
Comtrade database. For steel, copper and aluminium, the relevant SITC
trade codes were selected and the material intensity of goods traded
was determined either from existing literature or estimated by the au-
thors (see Table 1). The material intensities of each trade code are
available in the Supplementary information spreadsheet. For cement,
only the international trade of its primary form (Portland cement) was
considered. The cement quantities contained in transformed goods were
assessed to be negligible relative to both apparent demand and Portland
cement traded quantities, and are also relatively diﬃcult to identify in
any international trade codiﬁcation.
3.3. Material ﬂow accounting
For each year t, the total demand for each material m in its primary
form Dpf,m was calculated by adding production Ppf,m and physical trade
balance PTBPpf,m of materials in primary form (Eq. (1)). These ﬁgures
were then distributed as inputs Dtr,m to the manufacturing of main
product groups tr (Eq. (2)) using production split shares δtr,m derived
from other studies (Table 2). This approach takes product categories
directly from trade data and means that we do not need to apply MFA
data and allocate them back to product groups. The split shares are
assumed to be constant throughout the analysed period for steel and
cement due to the lack of a longer time series showing a change in the
structure of demand of primary materials. For aluminium, extended
time series were available through the Global Aluminium Model whilst
the USGS copper end-use statistics (USGS, 2015) are employed for
copper.
Intermediate material losses in the transformative industries tr were
considered to be negligible − most “new scrap” (the excess material
resulted from production processes) would be recycled and returned as
secondary materials to the production of primary forms, thus remaining
within the system boundaries. Hence, material input amounts Dtr,m
would be equal to the materials embedded in the output of the trans-
formative sectors.
The ADC values was calculated for each country by adding materials
from net traded ﬁnished goods PTBfg,m and the output of the transfor-
mative industries (equation 4). Materials embedded in the inter-
nationally traded goods were determined by applying material in-
tensities θfg,m (Eq. (3)) speciﬁc to each SITC trade code fg.
Demand for materials in primary form = +D P PTBpf mt pf mt pf mt, , , (1)
Distribution of materials to transformative sectors =D δ D*tr mt tr mt pf mt, , ,
(2)

















Data sources for material intensity of internationally traded goods
Material Data source
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Finally, stocks were calculated using diﬀerent product group life-
time assumptions in line with mean values found in previous studies
(Table 2). For simplicity, the calculation of stocks does not take into
account any uncertainty related to these lifetime values and thus an
implicit deterministic probability distribution was employed. For life-
time assumptions, a sample sensitivity analysis is provided for steel in
the Supplementary information.
3.4. Saturation analysis
We introduce two indicators which are both expressed in relation to
GDP per capita − ADC per capita and stocks per capita. These in-
dicators are employed to determine the extent to which industrialised
economies reach material-speciﬁc saturation. They also assist in asses-
sing the trajectory. China has taken on its pathway toward a high-in-
come economy. For the indicator representation, GDP per capita is
expressed in PPP terms using Geary–Khamis 1990 international dollars
with time series data taken from the Maddison Project database (Bolt
and van Zanden, 2014).
Once the annual stocks are derived from ADC levels based on the
method above, we can then delve into identifying the stage of each
considered material within a speciﬁc country. We propose grouping the
dynamics across the economic development curve into the following
three stages:
- A “growth” stage: in which per capita demand grows at a rapid pace
leading to a pronounced stock accumulation. Here an important
share of the GDP is dedicated toward the build-up of essential in-
frastructure and capital stock formation.
- A “maturing” stage: where per capita ADC starts to be stable.
However, ADC settles at a level that is higher than the volumes
required to replace the end-of-life products. This leads to a further
increase in per capita stocks, although at a lower speed compared to
the “growth” stage.
- A “saturation” stage: in which per capita ADC is converging towards
levels that allow for stock replenishment, therefore leading to per
capita stock saturation and even decline in the long run.
The three development stages can be operationalised using Table 3
which comprises an indication of how per capita ADC and stocks are
evolving at all stages. An interesting note is that the ‘saturation’ stage
can be categorised into diﬀerent sub-stages with diﬀerent dynamics as a
region moves further on the development curve (Fig. 2 phases 3–5).
‘Saturation’ is initiated once there is a sustained decline in per capita
ADC. This decline causes ADC to reach a level close to the stock re-
plenishment requirements and at this level, stocks start saturating.
There may then be a period where both ADC and saturation ﬂuctuate
around a central value. A ‘constant ADC and stock’ phase may not last
long, or may not be visible at all, as other structural factors may in-
ﬂuence ADC such as material use eﬃciency gains which trigger a fur-
ther decline in both indicators. Clearly, testing such a stylised model is
beyond the scope of our article, in particular as we expect any satura-
tion of stocks to have started rather recently, but we use it as a heuristic
device for our analysis.
4. Results
4.1. Per capita ADC and stocks
(a) Steel
Industrialised countries
For all studied countries, per capita steel ADC appears to saturate at
a level of 0.5-0.8 tonnes per capita once a threshold of $12,000 GDP/
capita is passed (Fig. 3). Nevertheless, these saturation ADC levels still
contribute to a further increase in stocks. The USA case suggests that
only after $16,000 GDP/capita does the ADC start to decline towards
levels that determine a decrease in stocks per capita. Germany experi-
enced the same trend with a current slowing down of stocks/capita
growth after $20,000 GDP/capita.
China
Growth patterns for steel in China follow the past trends of those
industrialised countries. Per capita ADC levels are increasing toward
the saturation levels obtained in other regions as the country goes be-
yond the $10,000 GDP/capita level. Stock levels have had an
Table 2
Product groups associated with steel, cement, aluminium and copper.
Material Product groups (life-time) Relevant study for production split
shares
















Aluminium Transport (13 years) Aluminium Association − Global















Stage ADC Stocks Description
Growth ↗ ↗↗ Rapid accumulation of stocks (1)
Maturing → ↗ ADC slowdown (2)
Saturation ↘ → Start of stock saturation (3)
→ → Steady-state (4)
↘ ↘ Material use eﬃciency adjustments (5)
Fig. 2. Stylised apparent consumption and stocks of materials along the development
curve.
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A change in consumption dynamics is observed for the same
$12,000 GDP/capita threshold at a level of about 0.4-0.7 t per capita
(Fig. 4). The USA is the only country to continue to increase its per
capita consumption beyond this income level although at a slow rate.
This phenomenon took place whilst the estimated levels remained
below those of other countries (Germany and Japan) along much of the
development curve. Consumption saturation in Japan at high per capita
values continues to increase the stocks signiﬁcantly, slowing down only
in the latter part of the country’s development.
Overall, the saturation of per capita stocks in industrialised coun-
tries is less visible for cement than for steel, with clear indications of
plateauing over a longer development phase for the UK and Germany
and only some incipient signs for the US and Japan.
China
China’s cement per capita consumption dwarfs the levels de-
termined in the industrialised countries. Whilst consumption stabilisa-
tion is observed, it is questionable whether the current 2.5t/capita
consumption level will be maintained for a longer period as current per
capita stocks are already comparable to those in industrialised countries
at their current development stage. The determined values are higher




Saturation in per capita consumption for aluminium starts at the
$17,000 income threshold in the case of the US (Fig. 5). Other in-
dustrialised countries face a dynamic change beyond the $20,000
threshold when the apparent consumption continues to increase but at
a slower rate. There are indications for consumption saturation at levels
of 20–25 kg per capita. Altogether one has to consider the wide range of
aluminium applications in medium to high-income economies, e.g. for
packaging. Except for the USA, where per capita stocks stabilise after
the $20,000 GDP/capita level, stocks in other industrialised countries
do not indicate any sign of saturation as yet.
China
China’s aluminium consumption outpaces the per capita consump-
tion and stocks of other countries, indicating a lower use eﬃciency than
other metals. Also, consequent to the high ADC levels, aluminium
stocks are increasing at a somewhat faster rate than the industrialised
countries. More explanations are provided in the discussion section.
(d) Copper
Industrialised countries
The per capita copper consumption in the selected industrialised
countries appears to have experienced variations during the $15,000-
$20,000 income range. From then on, copper consumption stagnated at
a level of about 10 kg per capita or even started to decline. As the most
developed economy, the USA faces similar dynamics for copper as for
aluminium − a ﬂuctuating consumption per capita around a central
value beyond the $17,000 income level and a steady growth of per
capita stocks with hints of saturation toward the end of the develop-
ment curve. Germany appears to have had a copper-intensive period
during certain development stages, perhaps as a result of the economic
recovery after WWII; this deserves a further investigation (Fig. 6).
China
The trend of per capita copper consumption in China is similar to
those industrialised countries, which indicates copper is somewhat
diﬀerent from the experience of aluminium. For stocks, the per capita
values in China are lower than those in the other economies.
Fig. 3. Steel ADC and stocks per capita.
Fig. 4. Cement ADC and stocks per capita.
Fig. 5. Aluminium ADC and stocks per capita.
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4.2. Time lags between ADC and stocks saturation
Fig. 7 illustrates a time series view on the evolution of ADC and
stocks for two materials, steel and cement, with the base year marking
the start of ADC saturation. Whilst ADC/capita appears to have peaked
for the two materials, in the 1950s for the US and 1970s for the other
industrialised countries, stocks continue to grow even forty years later
in some cases (Japan and Germany for steel, and Japan and the US for
cement). Nevertheless, per capita stock saturation does occur in several
countries, leading to the following insights: a) saturation of stocks is
possible when one country becomes wealthier; b) this informs material
consumption outlooks with expectations of continued declines in per
capita ADC from current levels.
Therefore, the consumption dimension suggests an earlier and a
more pronounced saturation stage in industrialised countries. However,
it does not reveal the broader picture of an increasing societal reliance
on materials. An important ﬁnding of our analysis suggests that there is
a considerable delay between the saturation of consumption and that of
stocks. For materials where stock saturation can be captured, the time
lag involved can last several decades. For instance, the USA takes
around 30 years to begin saturating steel stocks and 40 years for ce-
ment. Nevertheless, such a lag in stock saturation is dependent upon the
income growth rate, product group lifetime, evolution of consumption
structure, and the speed of ADC decline.
5. Discussion
Our general ﬁndings conﬁrm a remarkable variety across developed
countries using steel, cement, aluminium and copper, and the build-up
of stocks at diﬀerent rates, probably due to their very speciﬁc national
circumstances such as standards for buildings and other products, in-
stitutions and policies, and growth dynamics in general (see Section 2).
In this section, more perspectives will be discussed so that valuable
policy insights can be obtained.
5.1. Saturation overview for industrialised countries
The results of this analysis suggest an overall material use reduction
in the industrialised countries (see also Fig. 2). The dynamics across the
considered time horizon in this group of economies includes three
stages:
- A growth stage of demand and stocks over both per capita and GDP
dimensions. Regions accumulating wealth allocate an important
share of their GDP toward infrastructure build-up − early for the
US, followed by the UK and Germany prior to the 1970s, and Japan
− with a delay of one decade. These material use dynamics conﬁrm
the existence of a “1970s syndrome” as described by Wiedenhofer
et al. (2013) for developed countries, while adding a diﬀerentiation
for the USA, in line with the growth theories referred to above
(Section 2). Again, a database beginning in 1990 appears in-
appropriate for analysis of long-term growth patterns, and even a
start year of 1970 requires corrections toward earlier years.
- A “maturing” stage of stable demand measured in ADC occurred
when a shift toward diversiﬁed economic growth took place
(1970–1980s). During this stage wealth growth rates were less
pronounced. However, material stocks were still accumulating, as
suggested by the stocks/capita indicator. Such a ﬁnding conﬁrms
the need for infrastructure and capital stock maintenance, and the
diﬀerent dynamics on the consumption side, such as more spacious
housing patterns.
- A saturation stage where material demand is declining toward a
steady-state level that allows for a replacement of the infrastructure
reaching the end of its lifetime which is suggested by the constant
Fig. 6. Copper ADC and stocks per capita.
Fig. 7. Historical evolution of ADC and stocks – steel and
cement.
*cement: although the US does not show signs of ADC sa-
turation, the time series have the same start year as that for
steel for comparative reasons.
Source: own calculations
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per capita in-use stocks. At this stage a relative decoupling of eco-
nomic growth from infrastructure build-up can be observed through
the demand/GDP and stocks/GDP indicators, accompanied by a
selective absolute decoupling of demand from economic growth
(apparent for steel in Japan and the US; cement in UK, Germany,
Japan; Copper in Germany since the 60s, US since the 70s, Japan
since the 90s). Such an absolute decoupling is relevant for global
environmental change as it suggests lower levels of resource con-
sumption for future worldwide pathways than often expected.
However, these trends are neither linear nor give evidences to an
‘inverted U-curve’ as the saturation stage is rather ﬂat. Plus, a general
saturation covering all four materials cannot be conﬁrmed. In reference
to the analysis framework outlined in Section 3, the per capita ADC and
stocks indicators suggest that the saturation phase has been reached for
a subset of materials (cement, steel and copper) and not for all the in-
dustrialised countries. Particularly, per capita stocks in Japan continue
to increase across all four types of material. Referring back to Fig. 2 on
the ‘stylised apparent consumption and stocks of materials along the
development curve’ we ﬁnd solid evidences for steel in the USA, but not
for other materials and other countries. As expressed above, variety is a
dominant feature. While we acknowledge merits of such stylised ﬁgure,
one should be cautious to expect a simple application in reality. As
stocks seem to have reached saturation rather recently, further studies
should be conducted in this area in future years.
For steel and cement, there is a factor of two or three diﬀerence
between the lowest and highest country values across the two con-
sidered indicators (Table 4). These diﬀerences reﬂect the heterogeneity
regarding infrastructure intensity, consumption patterns and techno-
logical choices among developed countries. It is interesting to note that
the two ‘follower’ countries, Germany and Japan, have higher steel
consumption compared to the UK and USA, whose industrialisation
took place in earlier decades.
Interestingly, the UK have maintained steel stock/capita levels at a
constant level for much of its development curve− despite the absolute
increasing stocks, the growing population acts as a countering eﬀect
here. Early industrialisation in the UK may be a factor leading to such a
rapid stock saturation. A signiﬁcant drop in recent ADC/capita levels in
Japan may indicate that a similar stocks/capita saturation may occur in
the near future. The high ADC and stock levels in Japan, USA and
Germany can be explained by the signiﬁcant scale of their steel in-
dustries which may have knock-on eﬀects on domestic demand and
steel consumption intensity. Another signiﬁcant factor may be the scale
of manufacturing sectors which translate into signiﬁcant capital stock
requirements.
The per capita values obtained for in-use stocks in industrialised
countries are consistent with other relevant calculations. The steel es-
timates reviewed in Pauliuk et al. (2013) indicate the same spread of
stock values between high-use (Japan) and low-use (UK) countries with
an 8–14t/capita range circa 2005. The levels obtained for copper in this
article are in the middle of the 140–300 kg/capita range from UNEP
(2010) whereas for aluminium the obtained results are closer to the
lower end of the reported estimates − 350–500 kg/capita in UNEP
(2010) compared to 296–361 kg/capita in this study. For cement in
2008, Müller et al. (2013) identiﬁed a 13.7-25.2 t/capita span for these
countries. Similarly, stocks per capita in Japan and Germany are double
those in the UK and the USA. Lifetime assumptions are indeed crucial,
as the sensitivity analysis for steel presented in our supplement in-
dicates.
Due to data limitations, our stock levels do not include losses which
occurred during WWII. Nevertheless, any changes in stocks during
1939–1945 did not have a signiﬁcant impact over the saturation trends
observed; a simulations does not show a signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the
shape of the stock curves nor on the saturation income levels even with
an extreme assumption of all stock being destructed during WWII. This
low inﬂuence is explained by the largest part of stock accumulation
occuring since the 1950s.
It is noteworthy that per capita cement consumption is lower than
that of steel in all the industrialised countries; an observation under-
lining the extraordinary amount of cement consumed in China, which is
roughly ﬁve times higher than the levels in industrialised countries.
These steel levels can be attributed to the higher versatility of this
material which has implications over the speed of stock replenishment
− cement is locked in for many years in construction, whereas steel is
consumed in more applications and stocks for equipment, and trans-
portation and consumer goods need to be replenished more frequently.
Also, the greater lag for cement between the start of ADC/capita decline
and signs of stocks/capita saturation is a consequence of the longer
lifetime of cement product groups. Cement is mainly an input of the
construction sector and hence stocks continue to accumulate.
Interestingly, the gap in consumption and stocks within these four
industrialised countries appears to be lower for aluminium and copper
than those for steel and cement. This may be explained by the em-
bedding of these materials in products that are more intensely traded
internationally, thus lowering the impact of disparities determined by
locally speciﬁed applications e.g. construction.
These trend diﬀerences between the two material groups also reﬂect
the limitations of the approach taken in this analysis. New applications
of one material (either of those included in this article or others outside
i.e. plastics) could lead to a substitution eﬀect over the other. For in-
stance, the increased aluminium use in transportation has led to a lower
steel intensity in this sector. Thus, the relative sizes of material con-
sumption could give some further insights into how much material use
could grow through substitution. Fig. 8 shows the relative intensity of
aluminium use to steel for transport. The disparities between in-
dustrialised regions indicate an important growth potential in these
regions and even a higher potential for China. Nevertheless, assessing
the extent to which aluminium could replace steel requires more ap-
plication-speciﬁc studies − see EAA (2013) for instance.
The ﬁndings also suggest a division between two groups of mate-
rials, one being essential to infrastructure build-up (cement and steel)
and the other being speciﬁc to more advanced applications (aluminium
and copper). For the ﬁrst group, a saturation level for consumption is
observed around the $12,000 GDP/capita threshold followed by a
stagnation or even a decline in ADC per capita thereafter. For the
second, changes in dynamics of per capita ADC are visible only past the
Table 4
ADC and stocks per capita values in the industrialised countries and China.
Material Consumption Stocks
ADC/capita saturation (kg) 2013 values (kg) Stocks/capita saturation 2013 values
Industrial. China Industrial. China
Steel 400–850 227–530 543 9.8 t (UK), 15.9 t (US) 9.2–18.1 t 5.3t
Cement 350–720 150–390 1770 11.9 t (UK), 22.1 t (DE) 10.6–24.6 t 18.3t
Aluminium 25 (USA) 13.9–21.5 13 n/a 296–361 kg 93.6 kg
Copper 10.5(JP), 13.5(USA) 6.4–7.1 6.4 260 kg (DE) 194–241 kg 60.2 kg
R. Bleischwitz et al. Global Environmental Change 48 (2018) 86–96
93
$17,000 GDP, indicating that the use of these materials becomes more
intense in medium- to high- income economies.
The single-material view adopted in this article is useful in high-
lighting a tendency toward a saturation eﬀect in industrialised coun-
tries and should be treated as complementary to broader metrics, such
as DMC, which capture the dynamics of materials organised in func-
tional groups. Furthermore, the RME could be used to reveal the im-
pacts of adopting more advanced materials which are employed in
lower amounts but have potentially higher environmental implications.
5.2. Implications for China
As the high-income countries seem to have reached saturation in the
per capita consumption for three out of the four materials starting in the
1950s for the US and in the 1970s for UK, Germany, and Japan, it is
interesting to see that China is now close to similar values (Table 4).
The Chinese economy is unlikely to continue the same growth patterns
in the use of these commodities. Following pathways of other developed
countries and considering the projected stagnation or even population
reduction it is possible future consumption of steel, cement and copper
will be stable and may even decline in absolute terms. Our evidence is
consistent with the analysis by Yin and Chen (2013) for steel in China,
although it contradicts Hatﬁeld-Dodds et al. (2017: 408) which suggests
a strong increase in resource use by 2050. The consumption decline is
even more likely with ongoing eﬀorts toward a circular economy in
China (McDowall et al., 2017), which will enhance process innovation
and resource eﬃciency in manufacturing in general, recycling and the
use of secondary materials (see Haas et al. (2015) for an assessment of
the current status of a circular economy), as well as the development of
new goods and services that should require fewer primary materials.
China’s per capita ADC and stocks for steel and copper resembles
much the dynamics of those industrialised countries once the devel-
opment angle is adopted. Here we employ a consumption-based view,
and therefore these similarities rule out most of the demand for mate-
rials related to exports. As such, China’s current role as the world‘s
largest manufacturer is reﬂected in these indicators only by the capital
stock required for production processes and not by the embedded ma-
terials in exported goods.
The industrialised country to which China resembles most for at
least a subset of materials is Japan. Similarities between the two
economies for steel, copper and aluminium could be explained by the
late industrialisation in Japan as opposed to the other countries in this
study. Therefore, both countries are characterised by their high eco-
nomic growths for the better part of their development relying heavily
on infrastructure and capital stock build-up.
At the same time, Chinese cement consumption/capita has ex-
panded far quicker than that of any other countries. This evolution may
be attributed to the impressive number of infrastructure projects and
the local speciﬁcation of the construction sector. The high consumption
levels from an early stage of development have determined current
stocks/capita to be comparable to those currently determined in the
industrialised countries. Nevertheless, more insights into how cement is
being consumed in China are required in order to assess whether con-
sumption/capita is to be sustained at current levels or whether a decline
is imminent.
The aluminium trends reﬂect a more intense use. This suggests that
China is leveraging the technological options which are increasingly
reliant on aluminium (notably in construction and transportation) and
which were not available for industrialised countries at this stage of
development. Chinese aluminium ADC/capita is already comparable to
those in high-income economies. However, stocks are three times
lower, indicating that for some time high consumption levels are likely
to be maintained in order for stocks to continue to accumulate. A fur-
ther complicating factor is that industrialised countries do not show
signs of stock saturation for aluminium, hence these cannot, at least for
now, provide a reference point for the levels at which consumption and
saturation may peak.
Another key ﬁnding on growth patterns and resource use is that
both per capita consumption and demand per GDP are on similar tra-
jectories for the developed countries, with a clear saturation indication
beginning in the 1970s. However, this is not the case in China, where
any such saturation seems to occur for demand but not yet for the in-
tensity per GDP. Thus the Chinese economy may have a material eﬃ-
ciency gap compared to those developed countries; similar to what
Flachenecker and Rentschler (2015) proposed for the EBRD member
countries. Such a gap can be seen as a driver for the circular eﬀorts of
the Chinese economy.
6. Conclusions
Several developed countries have achieved a saturation stage in
consuming the key materials assessed in this study; we determine such
saturation values for Apparent Domestic Consumption at $12,000 GDP/
capita for steel at a level of 400–850 kg/capita, and for cement at a
level of 350–720 kg/capita. For copper, the saturation level starts a bit
later, at around $20,000 GDP/capita and consumption levels of
10.5–13.5 kg/capita, reﬂecting the diﬀerent applications in a more af-
ﬂuent society. Overall, the saturation evidence is strong for the per
capita consumption of steel, copper and cement in the four in-
dustrialised countries (US, UK, Japan, Germany), and it is somewhat
weaker for aluminium. However, with regard to China, we see early
indications of a saturation eﬀect in demand for steel and copper, and
the large consumption of cement would also be expected in favour of
stocks per capita coming close to a saturation eﬀect.
Our underlying data also suggests that, for the industrialised
countries investigated in our study, the build-up of stocks seems to
saturate too. Depending on the product lifetimes and patterns of stock
replenishment, there seems to be a delay of thirty years or more com-
pared to the demand saturation. The implications for future projections
of material consumption are probably relevant beyond the scope of our
article: China is unlikely to require the same continued increase in re-
sources in the future, and neither are the other industrialised countries
investigated in our study. An extrapolation of trends taken from the last
ten or twenty years should not be regarded as a guiding rule for future
market trends and investments. Without expanding the scope of our
article too far, we believe there is relevant evidence on resources being
used in emerging economies in general and we suggest that such a sa-
turation eﬀect is likely to stabilise demand in the future. Future re-
search should investigate the decoupling trend of GDP from resource
consumption through drivers of such a saturation eﬀect, as well as
through resource eﬃciency and circular economy eﬀorts.
Our study conﬁrms the slightly diﬀerent pathways for all four in-
dustrialised countries in the past, and variety is very likely to matter for
the future too. Accounting for per-capita income might thus be more
Fig. 8. Aluminium to steel relative intensity in the transport sector in 2012.
Source: own calculation from sectoral demand values
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appropriate than time series based on years. However, for the use of
steel, copper and cement in China, it is fairly rational for the country to
expect a stable demand. Closing the eﬃciency gap that appears to exist
between China and the industrialised countries will further contribute
to such a lower demand, perhaps even a decline in absolute terms. The
implications from China may provide more policy insights to other
emerging economies so that these countries can ﬁnd feasible pathways
to achieve decoupling development.
Future research on global environmental change and policies, in-
cluding the ones facilitated through UNEP’s International Resource
Panel, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the emerging G7
Alliance for International Resource Eﬃciency, should establish alter-
native baseline scenarios which include such a saturation eﬀect− with
clear relevance for the SDGs and their 2030 timeframe for delivery. The
implications of our ﬁndings for the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate
change are signiﬁcant as well as they relate to energy-intensive pro-
cesses in emerging economies, suggesting potential lower CO2 emis-
sions from such processes in the future compared to current business-as-
usual scenarios. However, caution must be taken as the development of
these materials in emerging regions in the future will play an important
role in the trajectory of global industrial GHG emissions.
We conclude that the early ﬁndings of resource economics on the
intensity of use conducted in the 1970s and 1980s can now be enriched
through more sophisticated indicators coming from the MFA debate
and indeed more data available through input-output datasets. Our
approach considers a time period longer than available MFA data and
applying this method to single commodities and a few core indicators
such as ADC seems useful for the decoupling debate and should be
integrated into modelling eﬀorts. The current MFA databases should be
enlarged to include decades before 1970 for key indicators, and include
hidden ﬂows associated with raw material extraction to the extent
possible.
Another policy implication derived from this interaction between
materials is that the analysed ADC indicator may complement other
MFA indicators such as the Domestic Material Consumption (DMC) or
the Material Footprint (MF). ADC could, therefore, help raise more
appropriate policies on mitigating material intensity especially for in-
dustrial sectors and relevant supply chains.
Finally, this study raises the need for further comprehensive studies
on the issue of material-speciﬁc saturation. Innovation and technical
changes will continue to enable the industry to use materials in new
product areas − thus a comprehensive perspective that captures sub-
stitution eﬀects and systemic innovation is required. In general, our
ﬁndings encourage more economic studies on decoupling, MFA, and a
saturation eﬀect from an international perspective.
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